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The Future of EU Civilian Crisis Management 
The security environment of the European Union (EU) 
has changed dramatically over the past decade. New 
complex conflicts have erupted in the EU’s neighborhood, 
including Ukraine, Syria, Libya and Yemen, while long-
standing conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan persist. 
Moreover, the rule-based world order has been increa-
singly fragmenting over the last years, and is facing a 
rise of interest-based foreign policy resting on power and 
deterrence. The EU has recognized that today’s problems 
arising from conflicts and instability cannot be solved 
by individual member states. Instead, EU member states 
have taken measures to react to old and new security 
challenges with one voice – for example, by taking a 
common position on the Iran nuclear deal and prioritizing 
political engagement in the conflict in Ukraine. 
Member states share the understanding that they must 
strengthen EU policies and instruments to rise to the 
many challenges. Military means can freeze conflicts and 
thereby provide space for negotiations, but they cannot 
create sustainable security. Therefore, in the present 
security environment, civilian crisis management is more 
needed than ever before. After member states strengthe-
ned the EU military cooperation in 2017, civilian crisis ma-
nagement ranked high on the political agenda in 2018.  
Currently, the EU maintains ten civilian crisis manage-
ment missions in its Eastern neighborhood, the Middle 
East, the Sahel and at the Horn of Africa with about 2,000 
staff. Experts are carrying out wide-ranging tasks such as 
strategic advice, monitoring, capacity-building and poli-
cing. In the field, missions cooperate and coordinate with 
six EU military CSDP missions, Commission programs, 
member state embassies, an Article 28 Action, and many 
more EU instruments and programs. Furthermore, they 
also interact with other national and international actors 
such as civil society, host governments, the UN or the 
African Union. To strengthen this EU-integrated approach 
to conflicts and crises, all instruments must be fit for pur-
pose – including civilian Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) and other civilian instruments.
In November 2017, EU member states began a political 
process to strengthen civilian CSDP for new security chal-
lenges and to renew political and resource commitments.1 
The first step to this end was to launch a new concept for 
civilian CSDP. In the second step, the European Exter-
nal Action Service (EEAS) drafted a Civilian Capability 
Development Plan, analyzing capability gaps and needs 
in current civilian missions and pointing out suggestions 
for further capability development in member states. The 
process culminated in the adoption of a Civilian Compact 
in November 2018 – which could be the start of an impor-
tant push for the whole of EU civilian crisis management. 
From 24-26 October 2018, the Federal Foreign Office 
of Germany, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 
hosted the conference “Moving Civilian Crisis Manage-
ment Forward” at Schwielowsee near Potsdam, Germany. 
It brought together all relevant stakeholders to discuss 
pressing issues and challenges ahead of EU civilian crisis 
management, and in particular, civilian CSDP. 
The conference results will provide relevant inputs for 
the EU member states who sealed the ambitious Compact. 
This initiative marks the beginning of a crucial process 
to make civilian crisis management fit for future chal-
lenges. Following the start of its implementation in 2019, 
significant work remains for the next years. DGAP and its 
project team on civilian CSDP will remain committed to 
support the further process through research and expert 
gatherings. We are looking forward to the next steps 
toward a further professionalization of civilian CSDP. 
Dr. Christian Mölling, Research Director, DGAP
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1.1 Executive Summary
As part of its efforts to strengthen its CSDP, the EU and 
its member states are attempting to enhance the civilian 
means of crisis management. In November 2018, they 
adopted a Civilian CSDP Compact to equally strengthen 
the civilian CSDP. The Compact will serve as a refence 
document for the whole-of-EU civilian crisis management 
in the next years. It marks the start of an implementation 
process in which member states can take decisive steps 
toward improved capabilities, structures and operational 
conduct.
In strengthening the EU as a civilian crisis manage-
ment actor, different challenges arise: Firstly, changes 
in the security environment demand a more responsive 
and flexible civilian crisis management. Therefore, the 
member states need to take measures to strengthen the 
EU as a civilian crisis management actor and make the 
missions fit for purpose. Secondly, in light of new security 
challenges such as hybrid threats, terrorism or cyber se-
curity, it is important to define for which priorities civili-
an CSDP is deployed. The old Feira priorities have to be 
revisited to make civilian CSDP fit for new security chal-
lenges. Thirdly, the implementation of the internal-
external nexus will be a key task for the coming years. 
Civilian CSDP missions need to cooperate and coordinate 
with EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol as well as 
other internal security actors. A functioning cooperation 
is crucial for the security in and around the EU. Fourthly, 
EU member states need to find common ground on the 
EU’s role as a security actor and the idea of a European 
Security and Defence Union. So far, member states have 
recognized the need for more cooperation to articulate 
EU interests on the international stage and to act as a 
capable actor and partner. 
Overall, civilian CSDP needs to be communicated 
strategically to crucial target audiences such as natio-
nal politicians, line ministries and the broader public to 
underline its relevance, purpose and successes. A better 
communication from EU institutions and Foreign Minis-
tries could foster the understanding for the instrument 
and greater support for the needs of civilian CSDP at 
national level. 
For short-term progress, the Civilian CSDP Compact 
2018 can serve as a reference document for ambitions and 
direction in 2019 and beyond. Crucial aspects are verifi-
able commitments, a regular review mechanism, as 
well as greater flexibility in the mandates. Member 
states need to strengthen and expand national structures 
as well as the secondment of personnel. To refocus and 
professionalize civilian CSDP, it needs to become an inhe-
rent part of national capability development. Through a 
review process, member states can exchange knowledge 
on capability development and track progress on com-
mitments. To make civilian CSDP more flexible, capable 
and responsive, it will be necessary to adapt the mission’s 
mandates. Mandates must be tailored to meet the needs 
arising from the individual conflict environments, the 
development of external factors during the mission, and 
new security challenges in general.
Background: A new EU Global Strategy
The EU is currently undertaking efforts to realign and im-
prove its CSDP. In today’s complex security environment, 
new security challenges cannot be tackled by individual 
member states, but demand a common response: Irregu-
lar migration, terrorism and hybrid threats can only be 
sustainably addressed in the EU framework. 
In 2016, the EU Global Strategy has put forward a rene-
wed analysis of the current strategic environment of the 
EU and new priorities for all of its external action. To im-
plement them, the EU will need both strong military and 
civilian means of crisis management. Consequently, the 
EU member states began to improve the CSDP to prepare 
it for future challenges. In 2017, they have strengthened 
the military realm through the Permanent Structured Co-
operation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).
1. Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward
The conference participants came from 21 different EU countries
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2.1. Dealing with the Nexus of Internal and 
External Security
2.1.1. Background: Dealing with the Nexus 
of Internal and External Security – The CSDP-
FSJ Response
By Roderick Parkes 
Status Quo: Overlap between CSDP Missions and 
Home Affairs Agencies
There is incipient competition between CSDP missions 
and home affairs agencies (also known as “FSJ agencies”, 
given their role in protecting the EU’s Area of Freedom 
Security and Justice). This competition arises because 
civilian CSDP missions and FSJ agencies increasingly 
overlap in tasks and geographic coverage. The competiti-
on is particularly intense between civilian CSDP missions 
and the borders agency Frontex.
The 2015-2016 migration crisis serves as an illustrative 
example. The crisis had two distinct root causes, name-
ly instability outside, and poor border standards inside 
the EU. CSDP missions are designed precisely to address 
instability abroad, and FSJ agencies to improve standards 
in the EU. However, some kind of a role reversal appears 
to have taken place: CSDP missions stretched ever closer 
to Europe until they were protecting the very border of 
Schengen, and Frontex experts were pushed ever further 
abroad into conflict zones.
Both formats are now operating in ways and places for 
which they were not designed. The EU’s current strategic 
reflections do not necessarily clarify matters. When the 
European Commission drafted its March 2018 Integrated 
Border Management Strategy for Frontex, it failed even 
to mention the Civilian CSDP Compact process. Realities 
on the ground reflect this lack of acknowledgement: FSJ 
agencies seem more eager to coordinate with military 
than civilian CSDP missions, since military missions offer 
potential access to military-grade intelligence.
Frontex is currently pursuing a series of status agree-
ments with third countries to rapidly deploy its own exe-
cutive missions, as well as tapping into EU development 
funds to sustain its work abroad. In stark contrast, civili-
an CSDP missions have long struggled to generate assets 
and political will for quick overseas deployments. They 
are pushing ever closer to the EU because it is expedient 
to appeal to EU governments’ internal security interests. 
They are proposing locations along the EU border where 
they could best “protect Europe”. 
Frontex looks set to come out on top in any competi-
tion with civilian CSDP missions. Frontex is currently 
being turned into a European border force with as many 
as 10,000 personnel. This will drain the pool of potential 
staff from civilian CSDP missions. Additionally, Frontex 
is likely to become even more enthusiastic about deploy-
ing staff abroad for the simple reason that member states 
resist its executive deployments on their own territory. If 
these trends continue, well-funded FSJ agencies could 
largely replace civilian CSDP missions abroad. Even 
military CSDP missions would be reduced to a supportive 
function, protecting FSJ agencies abroad. 
 
The Compact:  
Time to Consider Joint FSJ-CSDP Formats
As the EU has finite personnel and assets, it needs to 
consider more carefully how and where to place them. The 
Union could prepare plans for a series of joint FSJ-CSDP 
formats to deploy when the need arises. Currently, four ge-
neric options for joint FSJ-CSDP formats are conceivable:
1. Geographic division of labor: In this constellation, 
CSDP missions focus on the EU’s crime and migrati-
on problems at source abroad, home affairs agencies 
address the effects inside the EU, and joint FSJ-CSDP 
actions tackle the transit route. Alternatively, CSDP 
missions focus on scattered hotspots abroad, while 
FSJ agencies embed these in a regional dimension. For 
instance, the EU could deploy a CSDP border mission 
to Agadez, Niger, while FSJ agencies work with EU 
development funds to cover the entire Sahel region.
2. Sequential operations: CSDP missions retain their 
unique role in stabilizing the immediate drivers of 
crime and migration abroad, but hand over to FSJ 
agencies once circumstances relax. Thus, CSDP missi-
ons swiftly deploy, and address and contain the basic 
drivers of cross-border irregular migration, crime or 
insecurity. Frontex – or alternatively the EU Agency for 
Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), Eurojust, or Eu-
ropol – then takes over for the EU’s long-term engage-
ment and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the affected 
country.
3. “Plug-in” missions: Individual CSDP missions are 
deployed on a long-term basis. As they settle into their 
host country, and adapt their mandates to changing de-
2. Key Challenges in Future Civilian Crisis Management
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mands on the ground, they plug in to expertise stored 
in Frontex, Europol, or the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF). To this end, CSDP missions could either house 
FSJ personnel in situ, or liaise with Centres of Excel-
lence maintained by FSJ agencies in their headquarters 
or in individual member states.
4. Fully integrated EU missions: FSJ and CSDP person-
nel would work together in a third country at a joint 
diplomatic base, potentially the European Commission 
Delegation (EUDEL). Together, they have the potential 
to unlock a full range of EU international tools, inclu-
ding military cooperation, humanitarian aid, and basic 
development cooperation. This integrated CSDP-FSJ 
mission would in turn connect the EU to the local 
efforts of the UN or NATO. 
Future Challenges: Finding New Partners
The above debate about new EU security formats is a 
rather inward-looking one. It involves linking up the EU’s 
modest internal and external security arms, and it entails 
responding to international problems as and when these 
impinge on Europe. In reality, a growing range of third 
countries are becoming terrorist targets and migration 
destinations, and they are potential new partners for the 
EU and its modest resources. 
Even third countries which are normally protective of 
their sovereignty are increasingly inclined to cooperate in 
the face of new border, crime and terrorism threats. The 
head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) is Russian, so too is the OSCE’s Head of the Ac-
tion against Terrorism Unit. The recently resigned Presi-
dent of Interpol is Chinese, and non-Western multilateral 
platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organizati-
on and the Eurasian Economic Union are promoting their 
own customs and anti-trafficking rules. 
When the 2015-2016 migration crisis abated in Europe, 
it was in part because migrants were increasingly attrac-
ted to labor destinations far from the EU – to South Africa, 
Nigeria, and the Gulf. Indeed, even traditional emigrant 
countries in Africa and Asia are now themselves receiving 
immigrants, and are advocating for borders and read-
missions cooperation in the UN. Meanwhile, the EU itself 
has become a source of international security threats, as 
shown by the phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.
As the power and lure of third countries are growing, 
the EU’s ability to leverage this is actually shrinking. 
Brexit encapsulates some of the challenges facing the EU 
when it comes to finding and influencing new partners. 
The UK has made the EU more attractive and influential, 
and it retains ties to countries such as South Africa, Nige-
ria and Saudi Arabia. Yet, the debate inside the EU about 
the UK leaving is inward-looking – it is about the impact 
on CSDP and FSJ agencies, and which of the two might 
emerge stronger following the UK’s exit.
In finding new partners, the EU will need to rethink 
where, why and especially how it deploys CSDP and FSJ. 
For instance, Europe instinctively tends to think that 
speedy deployment is good, but Russia criticizes the 
EU’s undue haste to get boots on the ground without first 
seeking partners. The same applies to the EU’s instinct 
to break down internal and external silos as well as civil-
military distinctions. The EU may view it as necessary 
to break down these distinctions, particularly when 
dealing with a blurred security nexus. One should, how-
ever, remember that this also bears the risk of confusing 
potential partners.
Roderick Parkes is a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for 
Security Studies in Paris, where he works on home affairs 
cooperation. He is also an external fellow of the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and 
of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). He is 
writing here in a personal capacity.
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2.1.2. Current Challenges and Discussions
The EU currently faces multifold challenges in its 
external relations, including increasing migration, insta-
bility and insecurity, and crime. CSDP and Frontex were 
designed as instruments to respond to these issues. Due 
to the extension of competences and geographic scope of 
Frontex, tension or competition – rather than cooperati-
on – have come to characterize the current relationship 
between CSDP missions and Frontex operations. While 
this has not been an issue in past civilian CSDP missions 
(e.g. in Bosnia), it is an increasingly acute problem in  face 
of current plans to massively augment Frontex resources, 
both in personnel and budget. Therefore, this problem 
requires urgent attention.  
Several promising possibilities for a division of labor 
are under discussion. Among the four options currently 
debated at expert level, fully integrated EU missions 
would be an ideal solution for the mid- or long-term 
future. However, since they do not appear to be feasible 
in the next years, well-designed plug-in missions could 
serve as a viable alternative. In this scenario, missions 
would present the overarching frameworks in crisis areas 
to which others actors such as Frontex could plug in tem-
porarily. A third option would be a geographic division of 
labor, in which e.g. Frontex would operate in the EU’s Eas-
tern neighborhood and CSDP would be responsible for the 
South (i.e. Africa) – a scenario which experts associated 
with Frontex often prefer. Another possibility consists of 
sequential operations, in which CSDP deploys rapidly for 
short-term crisis management and hands over to Frontex 
once an operating area is stabilized. 
There is currently a range of operational challenges 
linked to the nexus of internal and external security. In 
light of the plans to massively upscale Frontex’s staff – by 
up to 10,000 – and budget, it is all but inevitable that com-
petition for resources and qualified staff will rise even 
further. This competition risks undermining the efforts 
for stronger coordination and cooperation in the field in 
an integrated approach. Sourcing enough candidates who 
are interested and qualified for both Frontex and CSDP 
missions at the same time is another related problem. The 
fact that training them adequately is time-consuming 
further adds to this issue. 
Key challenges for the future will be to demonstrate to 
a wider public the added value of civilian CSDP against 
Frontex, and to better communicate the former’s rele-
vance and successes. Experts tend to regard the massive 
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . In order to foster cooperation, actors need to address the existing competition between CSDP missions and 
Frontex due to overlaps both in geography and tasks. 
 . While fully integrated EU missions are a distant prospect, several possibilities for a functioning division of 
labor are under discussion.
 . Well-designed plug-in missions present a promising option for cooperation of CSDP missions with Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies. 
 . Relevant authorities must better communicate the successes and added value of civilian CSDP. To this end, it 
is vital for civilian CSDP to overcome operational difficulties to prove its added value compared to Frontex, 
which politicians might tend to support for the lure of short-term political capital. 
Working group on the internal-external security nexus Teemu Tammikko (FIIA) contributing to the discussion
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staff increase of Frontex as a rather short-term and easy-
to-implement political goal. This increase will require 
funds in the next Multiannual Financial Framework to 
appease the European public. Despite some ongoing 
efforts to better communicate civilian CSDP – such as 
the current ZIF initiative to offer experts returning from 
their missions a platform to inform the public about their 
experiences –, there are further opportunities for enhan-
cement when it comes to conveying crucial messages and 
information both to the media and the public. 
The role of information exchange has, thus far, not 
played a prominent role in developing civilian CSDP, but 
promises important potential for future cooperation on 
the internal-external nexus. A key topic for the future is 
the so far neglected issue of information and intelligence 
exchange. There is much room for improvement in CSDP 
and among JHA agencies and CSDP missions and opera-
tions in this field. The current pilot of a Crime Informa-
tion Cell in Operation Sophia, where Europol is sharing 
operational intelligence about human trafficking in the 
Mediterranean with the mission, has been an important 
leap toward making better use of this potential. If civilian 
experts and Frontex officers from different member states 
were to connect more regularly in common missions, this 
would mark another step toward achieving more comple-
mentarity.
Other relevant discussion points on the internal-ex-
ternal security nexus for the future are the viability of 
sharing border guards among member states, and the 
question whether instruments or executive and non-
executive tasks in CSDP should be mixed or not. These 
issues need to be discussed in the context of an increasing 
politicization of security: The priority is increasingly set 
on protecting Europe rather than addressing the roots 
and structures of conflict. To strengthen CSDP, member 
states should take into account its comparative advanta-
ges. To protect EU borders might not be one of them.
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2.2. The Civilian CSDP Compact as a  
Building Block of a Common European Se-
curity and Defence Union? 
2.2.1. Background: The Civilian CSDP Com-
pact as a Building Block of a Common Euro-
pean Security and Defence Union?
By Carina Böttcher
There are plenty of reasons to advance further integra-
tion in security and defense in the EU. The most impor-
tant ones are as follows: First, the security environment 
of the Union has changed. In light of complex conflicts 
and new security challenges in the EU’s direct neigh-
borhood, all member states recognize the need to take 
on more responsibility for their security. Second, frag-
menting multilateralism increases the risk of paralysis of 
other international crisis management actors such as the 
UN. Third, the EU can no longer rely on its traditional 
partner in security and defense, the United States, to the 
previous extent.
Against this backdrop, the idea of a European Secu-
rity and Defence Union (ESDU) has recently regained 
momentum despite the lack of a specific end date. There 
is a rising demand for more strategic autonomy for the EU 
in security and defense. But debates as well as the latest 
advancements towards this goal have almost exclusively 
focused on military aspects. In 2017, the EU military 
cooperation has experienced a push through the Perma-
nent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the European De-
fence Fund (EDF). Yet despite these advances, an ESDU or 
strategic autonomy for the EU cannot be realized without 
a strong civilian crisis management component.
Member states sought to strengthen the civilian CSDP 
through a Compact by the end of 2018. It will also sha-
pe the EU’s ambition for the entirety of civilian crisis 
management in the years to come. As of yet, it is unclear 
if this Compact will ultimately produce anything beyond 
broad political pledges, with negotiations illustrating 
how far member states diverge on priorities and vision for 
civilian CSDP. Thus, it is not sufficient to discuss capabi-
lities and operational details for civilian CSDP. Member 
states are facing a markedly more difficult task: to shape a 
greater strategic vision for EU civilian crisis management 
for 2019 and beyond, and to convert the Compact into a 
step towards an ESDU. 
Pushing Towards Greater Strategic Coherence in 
Civilian Crisis Management
Without a strong civilian crisis management to balance 
the EU’s military engagement, the effects of military crisis 
management will fall short. While military interventions 
can freeze conflicts and thereby open a space for negotia-
tions, it is only then that the actual work begins. Civilian 
crisis management is crucial for addressing the roots of 
conflicts that impact the EU’s security. In the range of 
civilian instruments, civilian CSDP can demonstrate quick 
presence and support local partners with stabilization 
measures. Highly visible, it is the flagship of the EU’s crisis 
management capabilities, and can initiate a cycle of sup-
port for partner countries to implement the EU integrated 
approach to create sustainable security. However, this can 
only function if the latter works effectively and if instituti-
onal quarrels about resources and competences cease. 
The EU lacks a shared strategic vision for civilian 
crisis management. Thirteen of the member states do 
not acknowledge the strategic relevance of civilian crisis 
management in their national security strategies, instead 
focusing exclusively on military crisis management.2 
Those who do mention its significance differ widely in 
their assessment thereof, from civilian crisis management 
as a pure support element to military action to attributing 
it a role in protecting core security interests in a changing 
world. Member states also lack a common understanding 
of which problems they wish to solve by civilian means in 
general and civilian CSDP in particular. 
The EU needs more integration in security and defense. 
Civilian crisis management must be an integral part of 
this effort and should not lag behind military advance-
ments. Therefore, it is of essential importance that the 
member states initiate a strategy process on civilian crisis 
management. While at a strategic level, the EU Global 
Strategy of 2016 was a promising move for promoting 
broader goals for the whole of EU external action, at 
member state level, it did not lead to commonly shared 
perceptions and preferences on security and defense – 
including civilian crisis management. Member states still 
differ on whether civilian crisis management is necessary 
and if so, to what extent. 
A strategy process dedicated specifically to civilian 
crisis management could clarify issues that currently 
hamper the full implementation of the EU integrated ap-
proach. The overarching question of this process should 
be: Do EU member states, through serious engagement 
in civilian crisis management, want to further promote 
a sustainable crisis management approach that responds 
to the needs of partner countries and encourages demo-
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cratization, inclusion of civil society and human rights? 
Member states also need to reflect upon which kinds of 
problems they wish to solve by civilian means, and define 
a clear division of labor between the civilian instruments 
while considering their individual strengths and weak-
nesses. Complementarity – rather than the redefinition of 
all instruments – should be the motto to enable a focus on 
common, immediate domestic priorities, as is the case in 
migration management. 
The Compact as an Intermediate Step Towards More 
Integration in Security and Defense
In late 2018, member states had the opportunity to decide 
on the role which civilian crisis management could 
assume in the next years. The Compact stirs momentum 
and opens up a unique window of opportunity. Thus, it 
must be used as an intermediate step towards a joined-up 
ESDU, even if this may appear distant for the moment. 
If the EU is serious in its ambitions to be a capable and 
credible actor in international security, civilian crisis ma-
nagement should not be regarded as a mere supplement. 
It is essential that member states overcome the pure 
technical and operational debates by clearly framing the 
Compact as a strategic long-term plan to strengthen the 
EU as a relevant actor in international security. 
The EU Global Strategy stated: “In a more complex 
world, we must stand united. Only the combined weight 
of a true union has the potential to deliver security, pros-
perity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive 
difference in the world.”3 The EU needs a strong civilian 
crisis management as part of its answer to conflicts and 
crises in the future. In 2019, member states can start to 
shape a true common vision for this by committing to an 
ambitious and strategically aligned Compact for civilian 
CSDP – and they should. In the Compact, this should be 
reflected through the following commitments: 
 . Member states should contribute to a strategic vision 
for EU security and defense through the Compact. They 
need to acknowledge that civilian crisis management is 
an integral part of a future ESDU.
 . Military and civilian efforts should be balanced. Mem-
ber states should not imitate advancements on the 
military CSDP, but reflect upon necessary measures to 
create valuable complementarity.
 . Member states should commit to the goal of an EU ci-
vilian crisis management strategy to be drafted in 2019, 
which defines clear goals for civilian crisis manage-
ment and establishes a clear and functional division of 
labor between the different actors in EU civilian crisis 
management. 
 . The Compact should contain a detailed timeline for 
implementation and the assessment of outputs. 
Carina Böttcher has been as a research fellow in DGAP’s 
Security, Defense, and Armaments program since June 
2018. She is working in the project “Civilian CSDP 
Compact“. Previously, Carina worked at the Center for In-
ternational Peace Operations in Berlin and for the Federal 
Foreign Office, with assignments in Tehran and Bangkok.
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2.2.2. Current Challenges and Discussions
The current strategic environment is marked by com-
plex conflicts in the EU’s neighborhood and a fragmenting 
multilateralist world order, which pose new challenges to 
the EU. The changes increase the need for the EU mem-
ber states to deepen cooperation on security and defense, 
as current challenges cannot be tackled by individual 
member states. The Compact opens a window of opportu-
nity to strengthen the role and relevance of civilian crisis 
management in EU security and defense cooperation. The 
document therefore needs to provide a clear direction for 
the further development of civilian crisis management 
and its strategic relevance.  
Member states positions diverge on whether a Euro-
pean Security and Defence Union (ESDU) – with no spe-
cified end date at this stage – could be appropriate for the 
strategic direction. A question in this context is whether 
the strategic framework for civilian crisis management 
is strong enough to make it an integral component of 
an ESDU or other frameworks for stronger cooperation 
or integration between member states. Most member 
states find that the existing strategic framework (the 
2016 EU Global Strategy and the May 2018 Concept Paper 
on civilian CSDP) is sufficient to guide effective future 
action in civilian crisis management. However, member 
states attach different levels of relevance to civilian crisis 
management. Some experts find that neutral actors such 
as think tanks tend to exaggerate the divergences among 
the member states’ positions. Indeed, there are wide 
overlaps of interests in security issues, and member states 
have realized that closer cooperation in this area bears 
the answer to new security challenges. 
In some member states, it is sensitive to frame civilian 
CSDP as a step towards an ESDU. Elsewhere, by contrast, 
a civilian component is so self-evident for citizens that 
they expect it to be a part of military defense strategies. 
One option would be to match the strengthening of civili-
an CSDP with PESCO in the military realm. While PESCO 
cannot serve as blueprint for civilian CSDP due to the 
diverging status quo of the two strands, the reasoning for 
the two is very similar and closely connected.
Many challenges remain on the way to strengthening 
civilian crisis management in the EU framework as a 
complementary aspect to a stronger military component: 
1) A central question is how to transform political com-
mitments and ambitions into action on the ground. 2) 
Member states and EU institutions need to find an agree-
ment on a functioning division of labor between civilian 
instruments of external action. 3) If the EU wishes to 
lead civilian CSDP to success, it must convince national 
governments to release budgets and resources for civilian 
missions. Line ministries do not currently consider efforts 
abroad as their utmost priority. 4) Member states need to 
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . Member states acknowledge the necessity for stronger cooperation on security and defense in the EU.
 . The strategic framework already exists, but needs to become member state-owned and avoid over-
burdening in order to generate strong operational commitments. 
 . Member states attach different levels of relevance to civilian CSDP. 
 . PESCO could serve as an inspiration for leveraging the civilian dimension to match the recently advanced 
military one. More strategic communication of civilian CSDP is an important tool in this direction. 
Working group on the ESDU Carina Böttcher delivering inputs in the working group on the ESDU
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find effective narratives in the communication with both 
EU citizens and national stakeholders to convince them 
that civilian crisis management is necessary and serves 
the broader vision of a secure and credible EU as a viable 
actor in international security and defense. 
For the way ahead in 2019 and beyond, civilian crisis 
management is relevant and must form an integral com-
ponent of the EU’s future engagement in crises. However, 
civilian CSDP needs to be embedded in a more coherent 
vision and the EU should work on drawing attention on 
previous success stories of civilian missions in third coun-
tries. One possibility would be to create public transparency 
about goals and achievements of missions and inform about 
concrete numbers of staff and resources on the ground. To 
support this, the Compact must be a readable, concise point 
of reference for the EU’s future civilian engagement.
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2.3. Strengthening the EU as a Civilian Crisis 
Management Actor – Making Civilian CSDP 
Fit for Purpose
2.3.1. Background: Making Civilian CSDP Fit 
for Purpose – Rapid Response, Civilian Capa-
bilities and the Integrated Approach
By Hylke Dijkstra
The implementation of the EU Global Strategy in 2016 has 
resulted in a fury of activity, including in civilian CSDP. 
In the last few years, the EU has established a Mission 
Support Platform with a Core Responsiveness Capacity. It 
has contracted a new “Warehouse 2.0” and created a new 
budget line for emergency measures. It is also gradually 
institutionalizing pre-deployment training through the 
European Security and Defence College. These are tangi-
ble achievements which have an everyday impact on the 
operations of civilian CSDP.4
Once adopted, the new Civilian Compact will present 
first and foremost a political declaration of the EU and its 
member states about the direction of civilian CSDP. The 
Civilian Compact will likely further emphasize the con-
tribution of civilian CSDP to the EU’s integrated approach 
highlighted in the EU Global Strategy. As such, civilian 
CSDP is part of the internal-external security nexus, 
which puts the security of EU citizens first. 
However, the Civilian Compact should be more than a 
political declaration aimed solely at road-setting and re-
affirming the commitment of the member states. It should 
also be ambitious in terms of the required capabilities for 
civilian CSDP. This includes strengthening the ability of 
the EU to rapidly deploy missions and the acquisition of 
the relevant civilian capabilities along the internal-exter-
nal security nexus. On a more general note, the Civilian 
Compact should be about the ability to sustain civilian 
missions by reducing vacancy rates.
As the EU Global Strategy notes, “[w]e live in a world 
of predictable unpredictability.”5 This requires rapid 
response and the ability to be resilient in the face of the 
unexpected. The starting point for rapid response is a 
stronger focus on advance planning and early warning 
– the long-standing Achilles’ heel of CSDP. Indeed, in its 
first decade, the entire planning machinery only began 
when the Political and Security Committee deemed that 
“EU action is appropriate”.6 This was quite extraordinary: 
It was almost as if NATO would only start planning after 
Soviet troops entered allied territory. Fortunately, the EU 
now has an elaborate early warning system run by the 
EEAS and the member states. Yet, the link with civilian 
CSDP can be further strengthened; for pro-active contin-
gency planning, for example. 
What has recently drawn attention is the proposal by 
the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) to 
civilian CSDP, in addition to sanctions and human rights.7 
The Commission notes that “there are still a number of in-
stances where unanimity has hampered effective decision-
making and prevented the EU from acting quickly and 
robustly.”8 While there are, in fact, no obvious examples in 
civilian CSDP, QMV could potentially be beneficial in the 
future – for instance, in the case of potentially increased 
EU presence in the eastern neighborhood or the Western 
Balkans where it might face some internal opposition from 
some member states. QMV would also make civilian CSDP 
the rule within EU activity rather than the exception.
When it comes to rapid response, however, very signifi-
cant advances can be made by improving the capabilities 
of civilian CSDP. The recent Core Responsiveness Capacity 
is an important achievement. It ensures that pre-identified 
staff can be quickly deployed during emerging crises. In 
addition, the Core Responsiveness Capacity strengthens 
the Brussels mission support structures. That said, it con-
sists of fewer than a dozen experts. To ensure real rapid 
response, some further imagination is necessary.
First, the EU could transform the Core Responsiveness 
Capacity into actual standing capacities. It could follow 
the example of the UN which has police agents and rule 
of law experts on its payroll. What is meant in this respect 
are not brigades or divisions, but simply a useful spare ca-
pacity that can be deployed at a moment’s notice not only 
for new missions, but also to strengthen existing missions 
during moments of crisis.
Second, the EU and its member states could start 
organizing deployments on the basis of teams rather than 
individual experts. The current human resource manage-
ment (HRM) plan of filling more than 1,000 vacancies 
each year is not sustainable. With the present vacancy 
rate of up to 30 percent in civilian CSDP missions, one 
cannot help but doubt that the EU is currently capable of 
launching a new mission matching the original scope of 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EU-
LEX), which consisted of as many as 2,000 international 
experts. If member states started working on the basis of 
teams rather than integrated units, recruitment would be 
markedly more straightforward.
Third, many member states still fall short where 
professional domestic HRM policy for civilian CSDP is 
concerned. Few have up-to-date rosters linked to basic ge-
neric training for civilian deployments (CSDP, UN, OSCE), 
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and career policy for police or judges does not generally 
include international deployments. Indeed, not much 
appears to have changed in the decade since the naming-
and-shaming analysis of Daniel Korski and Richard 
Gowan for the European Council on Foreign Relations.9
Fourth, the Civilian Compact makes a strong strate-
gic case for the internal-external nexus. Less clear is its 
impact on civilian capabilities. If the EU wants to include 
new priorities in civilian CSDP, such as migration, counter-
terrorism, border control, or maritime and cyber security,10 
relevant experts should be available for deployment and 
corresponding expertise be recruited for the EEAS and 
CSDP directorates. As of yet, much of such expertise does 
not even exist and would first need to be developed. 
In addition to rapid response, some financial aspects 
remain to be addressed in making civilian CSDP more 
sustainable. The salary component for seconded national 
experts merits special attention. If the EU earnestly wants 
to incentivize member states, and the domestic minis-
tries of interior and justice in particular to participate in 
civilian CSDP, it cannot rely on charitable contributions 
that leave member states with domestic vacancies in local 
police stations and court houses. Some member states 
have adopted models where, for instance, the ministry of 
foreign affairs compensates the other ministries for the 
resulting vacancies. This best practice is not presently 
shared across the continent.
Rather, the EU should consider providing member 
states direct compensation from the CFSP budget. This is 
not as unprecedented as it may seem: Firstly, it is already 
common practice for the EU to hire – and fully remunera-
te – experts on a contractual basis if no qualified secon-
ded national experts are available. Secondly, European 
Commission proposals for a Frontex operational capacity 
of 10,000 border guards stipulate that these will be paid 
from the EU budget.11 Thirdly, the UN already provides a 
flat-rate compensation to countries contributing to peace-
keeping missions. 
Part of sustaining civilian capabilities within missions 
is also to further develop the training model. The stan-
dard approach has invariably been for member states to 
provide staff and thus to be in charge of training such as 
the basic generic training, pre-deployment training, and 
hostile environment awareness training. While there is 
some EU-level effort done on certification, the reality is 
that 28 member states cannot organize a monthly pre-
deployment training tailored for ten different civilian 
CSDP missions. It would be beneficial to further address 
training needs through the European Security and De-
fence College.
Civilian CSDP remains work in progress. The day-to-
day operational situation has improved compared to a 
decade ago, and there is increasing evidence that the EU 
and its member states are taking pragmatic steps and 
evading the existential political discussions on CSDP. 
However, if civilian CSDP is to become a regular EU 
activity with a dozen ongoing missions and thousands of 
deployed staff along the entire internal-external security 
nexus, considerable additional steps remain to be taken 
with respect to civilian capabilities.
Research for this paper has received funding from the 
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement no.: 653227. The content 
reflects only the author’ views, and the European Commis-
sion is not responsible for any use that may be made of the 
information it contains.
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2.3.2. Current Challenges and Discussions
There has been improvement in civilian CSDP in the last 
years with regard to making missions more responsive. 
For example, a “Warehouse 2.0” for rapid equipment 
was established, and the EU early warning system was 
strengthened. However, there are still many aspects that 
need improvement if civilian CSDP is to take the next step. 
Strengthening rapid response is one example. To this 
end, the EU should further fortify the link between the 
early warning system and the civilian CSDP capabilities. 
Moreover, reaching a decision of 28 member states to 
demonstrate presence rapidly in crisis situations can at 
times be time-consuming. 
It is crucial for civilian CSDP to keep analyzing the 
security environment in advance and prepare for pos-
sible future missions in hotspots. Many experts favor to 
have a limited EU contingency planning in the form of 
standing capacities as is the case at the UN, which can 
be deployed at any moment. While “Warehouse 2.0” is a 
good start, member states also need to be able to provide 
personnel rapidly for missions to be successfully laun-
ched at short notice. 
There is a renewed debate on the utility of Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) in civilian CSDP. On the one 
hand, QMV could accelerate decision-making processes 
and avoid political blockades. On the other hand, it risks 
weakening civilian CSDP: This is because one compara-
tive advantage of civilian CSDP is that it enjoys strong 
political backing by member states, and that its actions 
represent the interest of a substantial number of member 
states. Ending the practice of unanimous decision-making 
could therefore weaken the member states’ undivided 
political support for civilian CSDP and its missions. Mo-
reover, introducing QMV would not solve any of the most 
pressing issues in civilian CSDP. 
There are weaknesses and open questions in the coor-
dination in civilian CSDP missions. A frequent case in 
host countries is that all of the many different actors pre-
sent wish to coordinate, but none of them are prepared 
to be coordinated. Currently, the EU is not in a position 
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . To make civilian missions fit for purpose, a fully-fledged mission support platform, longer mandates and 
better planning for the staffing of generic positions in missions present viable options.
 . Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would not solve the pressing problems in CSDP.
 . A more flexible and modular approach needs to be supported by an equally flexible budget allocation on the 
Commission side. 
to assume an overall coordinating role for all internatio-
nal actors on the ground. What is unclear is whether the 
EU with its civilian CSDP should take a stronger coordi-
nating role specifically in crisis management situations: 
While by claiming a coordinating role civilian missions 
could ensure its standards, better internal coordination 
needs to come first. First and foremost, missions should 
support UNDP, which usually has the coordinating role 
in fragile contexts. 
In the upcoming EU Multiannual Financial Frame-
work for 2021-2027, member states must find solutions 
to cure an apparent lack of financing and resources in 
civilian CSDP. One option to make civilian CSDP com-
mitments more attractive for member states is to use a 
common budget to fully remunerate the staff provided 
by member states, as well as to reimburse member states 
for the necessary substitutes in national administrations. 
Nevertheless, these reimbursement funds would always 
come from the member states through the EU budget. The 
problem could also lie in a lack of trust rather than a lack 
of willingness to contribute to CSDP financially. 
Flexible mandates and missions and a modular 
approach are necessary to better respond to the current 
conflict environment. Stakeholders widely recognize that 
longer mandates and missions are required to achieve the 
desired impact and enter a fruitful dialogue with civil so-
ciety in the host country. An open question in this context 
is whether mandates must be attached to clear end-states 
as targets for the missions. Defined end-states bear risks, 
as one cannot foresee the exact necessary duration of 
a mission, and missions need to be reactive to the con-
flict environment. In a dynamic conflict environment, 
missions need to be able to adjust and adapt to external 
developments; i.e. to add or remove components. Such a 
modular approach to missions would have implications 
on the CSDP budget, since the Commission would need 
to find a way to grant the budget flexibly for the different 
modules. Effects on the budget would thus be less predic-
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table, but missions and their actions on the ground could 
become more cost efficient. 
A crucial point for concerted EU external action is 
to incorporate the integrated approach in all efforts to 
strengthen civilian CSDP in the future. By doing so, mem-
ber states can ensure communication between all actors 
and enable a comprehensive view on the EU capabilities, 
considering all instead of individual instruments. 
With regard to the way ahead in 2019 and beyond, 
changes in civilian CSDP will need to be a step by step 
process. A first step could be to create a mission support 
platform, and thereafter, to foster a standing capacity 
of the EU (for generic tasks) and to develop specialized 
teams. In this respect, all member states must individu-
ally carve out the optimal way in which they can make a 
contribution.
Dr Hylke Dijkstra (Maastricht University) providing his input on a civilian 
CSDP fit for purpose
Magnus Nordström (Swedish MFA) highlighting important aspects
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2.4. Revisiting Feira – Implementing the EU 
Global Strategy in the face of new security 
challenges
2.4.1. Background: Revisiting Feira –  
Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the 
face of new security challenges
By Tobias Pietz
In their “Pathways to Peace” Report, the UN and the 
World Bank assess that in 2018, the number of violent 
intra-state conflicts had grown threefold since 2007.12 
In the same decade, the EU civilian missions’ total staff 
has been reduced to a third. With the exception of the 
military Operation Sophia, civilian CSDP thus shares the 
problem that all missions have faced since the Treaty of 
Lisbon: decreasing interest and lack of commitment from 
member states.
Therefore, it is high time to revisit this instrument, mo-
dify it for the future, and to generate a new momentum 
with solid commitments from member states. The EU Glo-
bal Strategy (EUGS) offers a fitting framework to that end, 
and sets three strategic priorities for CSDP: to respond 
to external conflicts and crises, to build the capacities of 
partners, and to protect the Union and its citizens. 
Since the adoption of the EUGS, the launch of the 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the 
European Defence Fund in 2017 has boosted the military 
aspect of European security. First mentioned in November 
2017,13 the idea of a Civilian CSDP Compact gained trac-
tion throughout 2018 by virtue of the Compact’s concept 
paper, the Civilian Capability Development Plan, and a 
series of relevant exchanges in European capitals.
In 2016, the European Council had called for the 
revision of the civilian CSDP priorities to adapt it to the 
evolving security needs. Also known as the “Feira prio-
rities”, these had been defined in the Portuguese city of 
Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 in the four following 
domains of civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, 
civilian administration, and civil protection. With the ex-
ception of civil protection, all points have been effectively 
translated into a range of civilian missions. Monitoring 
capacities, support to EU Special Representatives, Securi-
ty Sector Reform (SSR), and Disarmament, Demobilizati-
on and Reintegration (DDR) have since been included as 
additional priority areas.
Following various discussions in late 2017 and early 
2018, the European Council presented an internal concept 
paper entitled “Strengthening Civilian CSDP” in April 
2018 which identified possible new lines of operation for 
CSDP. According to the concept paper, these new tasks 
were security challenges “linked to irregular migration, 
hybrid threats, cyber security, terrorism and radicalizati-
on, organized crime, border management and maritime 
security, as well as preventing and countering violent 
extremism”.14 The European Council Conclusions in the 
following month endorsed these new lines of operation, 
while also emphasizing that the Feira priorities remained 
the “core function of civilian CSDP”.15
This raises some crucial questions: If the four priorities 
defined in Feira remain the core function of civilian CSDP, 
what should be the role of the new lines of operation? 
Will there be dedicated CSDP missions mandated with 
specific priority areas such as migration management or 
cyber security? Or will these tasks be included as mere 
supplements in broader missions? These points remain 
unclear and subject to varying interpretation depending 
on the member state.
It seems that the sorely needed revision or adjustment 
of CSDP tasks through the concept paper did not emanate 
from a clear assessment by stakeholders, but was rather a 
reaction to the most pressing domestic issues for mem-
ber states. All new lines of operation have a clear link to 
internal security and thus foremost to the first of the five 
strategic priorities of the Global Strategy: to protect the 
Union and its citizen.
Naturally, CSDP – a highly political tool in itself – needs 
to keep various demands and interests of different actors 
in balance in order to be efficient and effective. Further-
more, member states’ political engagement for and, con-
sequently, commitment to CSDP missions are achievable 
only if governments recognize their utility, including their 
value for domestic ends. With their clear link to internal 
security, then, these new lines of operation could have a 
valuable potential to generate political will for CSDP mis-
sions among hitherto reluctant governments. 
Despite this opportunity, however, managing the 
expectations on what CSDP can realistically deliver in 
these areas will be key. As the European Council Conclu-
sions and various other documents state, CSDP is but one 
actor in security and, with the growing tendency to take 
a backseat to EU actors such as Frontex or Europol, it does 
not hold a comparative advantage in any of the new lines 
of operation. Performing well in contentious and com-
plex issues such as irregular migration, cyber security or 
counter-terrorism under the wary eyes of member states 
will be no bed of roses, and if gone wrong, could jeopardi-
ze other existing or future CSDP missions. 
Moreover, the new lines of operation are not on par 
with the demands and priorities of local partners in post-
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conflict situations. Recent papers by the Global Public 
Policy Institute (GPPi) and the Clingendael Institute even 
suggest that some operations – such as those aimed at 
supporting border and migration management – can have 
harmful and destabilizing effects in the host country.16 
This risks undermining CSDP’s legitimacy and credibility 
among local partners, which are essential for stabilizati-
on, peacebuilding and external crisis management.17
To date, a clear common understanding of CSDP’s 
future tasks appears to be lacking. For that reason, the 
Compact should – especially in its envisaged implemen-
tation phase in the next years – entail a knowledge-based 
and transparent process for a revision of the Feira priori-
ties through: 
 . an assessment of external needs and demands for CSDP 
missions (local partners as well as UN, OSCE and Afri-
can Union (AU) peace operations)
 . a review of successful cases in the implementation of 
the Feira priorities in CSDP missions
 . an assessment if the currently available resources, 
personnel and expertise are still sufficient to implement 
the old priorities
 . a mapping exercise to identify which EU actors or inst-
ruments have comparative advantages in which fields
 . a feasibility study on how to improve or maintain 
resources/personnel/expertise in old and new lines of 
operation
 . a decision on which tasks to forgo, to add, or to 
strengthen
Needless to say, a mere discussion on what tasks future 
missions should perform will hardly suffice to meet the le-
vel of ambition for CSDP as foreseen by the EUGS and the 
respective Council Conclusions in 2017 and 2018. However, 
without a clear vision of what truly works for stabilization, 
crisis management or peacebuilding, CSDP is doomed to 
failure.
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2.4.2. Current Challenges and Discussions
When the EEAS circulated a new concept for civilian 
CSDP in May 2018, it sparked a lasting debate among 
member states and other actors about the role of the Feira 
priorities in light of new security challenges18 inclu-
ding irregular migration, hybrid threats and organized 
crime. In the past, some actors had feared that the new 
security challenges would override the Feira priorities 
in future missions. By contrast, a consensus appears to 
have evolved that the new security challenges could be 
subsumed under Feira. According to this approach, the 
Feira priorities are seen as a set of broader tools to tackle 
new challenges.
It is crucial to frame the new challenges appropriately 
in order to keep civilian CSDP supportable for all, both in 
terms of its focus and to avoid setting unrealistic expec-
tations. A self-centered civilian CSDP which shifts away 
from a partnerships-promoting approach is risky and 
could have lasting negative effects: If CSDP actors focus 
exclusively on EU interest and neglect host countries’ 
needs and challenges, they could destabilize operating 
areas and create tensions with host countries in the long 
term. Capacity building in the shape of building institu-
tions, for instance, is currently considered a core strength 
of civilian CSDP missions. This makes CSDP not a mere 
symbolic tool (in the words of a discussant: “just raising 
the flag”), but a strategic instrument. 
The consensus both on the unchanged relevance of the 
Feira priorities and the future tasks for the new security 
challenges leads to several suggestions: 1) More evalua-
tion on prior missions and a “revisiting of Feira” to de-
termine what has worked so far. 2) The Compact needs to 
leave flexibility in civilian CSDP priorities so they can 
be changed in response to new, unforeseen challenges. 3) 
The analysis of the crisis situation on the ground prior 
to deployment is important and should be strengthened. 
This analysis should involve line ministries which are 
responsible for bilateral interaction with host countries to 
avoid duplication. Moreover, involving military analysis 
could potentially improve shared analysis and allow 
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . The Feira priorities can be seen as broader tools to address new security challenges. 
 . More evaluation on prior missions and a “revisiting of Feira” is needed to determine what has worked in the 
past. An objective evaluation is needed.
 . A self-centered narrative of civilian CSDP could have adverse effects; adapting the priorities bears manifold 
operational challenges.
for useful synergies. Civilian mission planning tends to 
neglect the link to military operations, and personnel on 
either side are not trained to work with one another. 
Regular analysis missions to mission operating areas 
present a further significant potential which has thus 
far not been sufficiently used: These could consist of EU 
member states and independent experts, including in 
cooperation with the UN. As EU missions can become 
a party to a conflict, analysts should investigate power 
structures in advance. This analysis should feed into 
the planning of the mission to prevent manipulation by 
conflict parties and, more generally, to become part of the 
conflict dynamic. The mission is only justified if it takes 
more from the conflict than it adds to it. 
The German Federal Government’s proposed com-
mitment in the shape of a new Center of Excellence in 
Berlin could act as an independent platform, as well as a 
means to include more expert analysis in civilian CSDP.
Tobias Pietz (ZIF) starting the discussion on the Feira priorities
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3.1. Clearing the Commitments:  
Member States’ Inputs to the Compact
Adopted in November 2018, the civilian CSDP Compact 
contains commitments made by member states and EU 
institutions in order to strengthen the civilian CSDP for 
future challenges. These commitments will set the stage 
for the Compact’s implementation in 2019 and beyond – 
and as such, carry central importance for a sustainable 
and ambitious progress of the instruments. Conference 
participants discussed necessary commitments ahead of 
the EU’s agreement on the Compact. 
Most member states agree that commitments should 
be made and followed up collectively. Member states 
should focus on comparative advantages, and not feel 
pressured to contribute in every aspect. 
For the future of civilian CSDP, it will be essential to 
have the necessary capabilities. A key to making civilian 
CSDP fit for the current security challenges thus lies in 
how to build and sustain these capabilities. To avoid 
duplication and make capability development for CSDP 
cost effective, it should not run separately from capability 
development for national purposes: The goal should be to 
make the necessary qualifications for CSDP an inherent 
part of national capability development, e.g. in the police 
force. Whether the capabilities should be determined by 
numbers or goals remains open. Common benchmarks 
could serve as an option in this regard. Furthermore, a 
large share of required capabilities is generic for each 
mission (e.g. IT and logistics, between 60-80 percent). 
Those capabilities can be developed without anticipating 
the needed quantities, as they are in high demand in 
peace operations of other organizations or in national 
administrations as well. For capabilities in the areas of 
hybrid threats and cyber, one idea could be that the two 
Centers of Excellence provide capabilities in the form of 
short-term assessment teams. 
Training is a key issue to develop necessary capabili-
ties and thereby professionalize civilian CSDP. More stan-
dardization and harmonization are needed; experienced 
member states should therefore share best practices. 
Pre-deployment training with the European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC) can only complement preceding 
basic training by member states. Thus, it is essential 
that national trainings are harmonized and guarantee 
certain standards. An EU civilian training group consis-
ting of member state institutions could provide strategic 
guidance. One idea is that mission leadership undertake 
pre-deployment training together to foster a shared un-
derstanding before going into mission. A further option is 
an EU-integrated training cell in the EEAS (as is the case 
in the UN), which could hone responsibility and owner-
ship for training.
The Compact needs to address the demand for flexi-
bility and modularity for each mission whilst avoiding 
to be vague. One option to make missions more flexible 
and to allow them to focus on core tasks is to establish 
a fully-fledged mission support platform in Brussels. 
Deploying pilots on new capabilities in suitable missions 
for a limited period of time is a promising stride toward 
making civilian CSDP more flexible and modular, as is the 
development and deployment of specialized teams. More 
staff should receive core training in advance and be pre-
pared for flexible and quick deployment, so that in case 
of a dispatch, they merely require a swift pre-deployment 
training. 
If there is a means to extend recruitment beyond 
civil servants in more member states, it would give 
secondment considerable potential. To encourage more 
member states to make advancements in this regard, it 
is important to enhance the exchange of knowledge and 
best practices. More secondment would help member 
states retain their ownership in CSDP. Capitalizing on 
the momentum of the Compact process at national level, 
several member states are now willing to strengthen 
national structures for recruitment. Nevertheless, besides 
structural improvements, member states must strengthen 
and align the incentives for seconded personnel to create 
long-term sustainability – so far, contracts are often more 
3. The Way Forward – How to Strengthen Civilian CSDP
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . Commitments should be made and followed up 
collectively. Member states should focus on com-
parative advantages, and not feel pressured to 
contribute in every aspect.
 . Improvements in recruitment, training and 
national structures are key challenges to further 
professionalize civilian CSDP. 
 . National implementation plans are important not 
only as reference documents at national level, but 
also to track the implementation of commitments 
from the Compact.
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beneficial for staff in terms of salary or social security. A 
centralized human resources management (HRM) in 
CPCC could also help make civilian CSDP more attractive 
for secondees. Apart from applying a more professiona-
lized approach than single missions, a centralized HRM 
would make it easier to offer career options to secondees 
by switching missions. 
Experts are divided over the necessity and usefulness 
of quantitative targets in civilian CSDP. On the one 
hand, it would be reasonable to build on the existing ca-
pacities for rapid mission equipment through the strategic 
Warehouse (200 persons within 30 days) with a corres-
ponding quantitative target of 200 civilian experts to be 
deployed within 30 days. On the other hand, numerical 
targets do not automatically guarantee a sustainable and 
ongoing capability development process at national level. 
What experts do widely agree upon is that national 
implementation plans can serve as effective national 
reference documents which can integrate the Compact 
and articulate it further. By means of the plans, member 
states could also track the implementation of commit-
ments. To ensure their best use, member states need to 
establish regular communication channels on national 
plans and contributions. 
An adequate timeline to fulfill commitments is also 
important: The time frame should allow for the momen-
tum of the current political processes to endure, but 
should refrain from being overly ambitious lest the un-
dertaking lose credibility. While many actors deem a time 
frame of three to four years as expedient, others advocate 
for a longer horizon. 
Third state contributions to missions should be en-
couraged to fill capability gaps. However, this requires an 
updated framework for these contributions. 
In future discussions about potential mission areas, the 
services should provide informed estimates on costs 
of different options to member states prior to decisions 
about missions. In this context, member states should also 
make better use of Political Frameworks for Conflict 
Analysis (PFCAs) prior to mission deployments. 
3.2. Sustaining the Compact:  
How to Establish a Reliable Review Process
The Compact should include review processes to accom-
pany the ongoing efforts to improve civilian CSDP. 
The Compact should substantiate a review process to 
track the commitments made in the Compact. This re-
view of commitments should be linked to national budget 
discussions. Experts widely agree on the need for concre-
te national implementation plans. These plans could serve 
as a basis to evaluate whether or not member states are 
meeting their targets and honoring their commitments. 
In the implementation phase of the Compact com-
mitments, there should be a fixed timeline for review 
processes. Regular reviews are necessary to ensure 
that member states act within the agreed period. Many 
support a review period of one year, as this would keep 
the political attention high and would correspond to 
the annual budget cycles. Moreover, the future review 
of commitments should not only be backward but also 
forward-looking. The use of best practice examples from 
other international organizations (such as the UN or 
NATO) was encouraged. Review processes should be stan-




 . The Compact should include review processes. 
Two sets are plausible to accompany the current 
strengthening process of civilian CSDP: Review 
processes (1) of member states’ commitments in 
the Compact, and (2) of capabilities. 
 . A review on commitments could help member sta-
tes track their implementations and demonstrate 
credibility to partners.
 . Most participants were in favor of a peer review. 
Other suggestions included reviews through the 
Foreign Affairs Council or a specialized secretariat 
in the EEAS. 
Irene-Maria Eich (ESDC) highlighting additional aspects in the commit-
ments working group
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There are many reasons to support of a well-designed 
commitments review process: It allows member states 
to demonstrate their political will to strengthen civilian 
CSDP and to foster credibility of the instrument, both 
domestically and toward contributing third states and 
host governments. Reviews can also ensure that budget 
and resource needs of civilian CSDP are met and, if well 
designed, support the transfer of knowledge among 
member states. Lastly, reviews of commitments could 
also promote strategic communication of civilian CSDP to 
both citizens and governments: For EU citizens, review 
processes demonstrate transparency and illustrate the 
relevance and added value of civilian CSDP. For national 
governments, review processes display how their funds 
are being used. 
An important question is which actors should over-
see the review processes. Many member states favor 
peer review processes. Some also find it necessary to 
increase pressure to guarantee that commitments are 
indeed met. At the same time, most insisted the reviews 
must not result in public “naming and shaming” for those 
member states who fall behind their commitments. At the 
same time, it would be a positive signal to reward highly 
engaged member states. On the positive side, self-evalua-
tion of member states might fuel domestic debates within 
the countries and increase the involvement of line minis-
tries. A scheduled public comparison might also motivate 
member states to work on commitments continuously. 
Another possibility would be to refer the review 
process of the Compact commitments to the care of the 
Foreign Affairs Council; an option which offers clear ad-
vantages and disadvantages: While the Council could in-
volve the highest possible level, this option risks a further 
politicization of the review processes, and subsequently, 
a lack of neutrality. Neutral institutions such as a special 
secretariat within the EEAS or think tanks could poten-
tially offer an alternative to the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Currently, CPCC has the best overview but does not have 
the sufficient personnel to conduct reviews. 
Whether sanctions could help the process is a con-
tentious issue: On the one hand, there must be a level of 
consistency if a country does not fulfil its target. On the 
other hand, sanctions are undesirable and, importantly, a 
legal basis for such a mechanism is currently non-existent.
The necessity of regular reviews of capabilities in 
missions to sustainably track the Capability Development 
Plan is another separate issue. Such reviews could clarify 
urgent questions such as those on which capabilities are 
sufficient and insufficient in current missions, and where 
the gaps are. Crucially, capability reviews offer a feed-
back loop from national staff back to the EEAS, which 
is a prerequisite for lessons learned to feed into future 
missions. One step to strengthen this approach would be 
to re-establish the position on lessons learned at CMPD. 
Furthermore, the review processes could also improve 
communication from the opposite direction: from the 
EEAS to member states. This way, the EEAS could notify 
how many staff and resources it needs from member 
states in the future, which would allow the latter to plan 
ahead. 
3.3. Mission Mandates and More:  
Implementing the Concept
The new concept for the future civilian CSDP from May 
2018 aims to make the instrument more flexible, scalable, 
capable, and modular. The last rapid mission set-up of 
EUAM Iraq in autumn 2017 signaled that in practice, the 
implementation of this new concept is already underway. 
Given the current window of opportunity, this needs to 
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . The implementation of more flexible and rapid ap-
proaches is already underway. Now, new manda-
tes need to support this development. 
 . Longer mandates should be a further step toward 
implementing the new concept for their capacity 
to e.g. foster relations of the mission in the host 
state. 
 . More first-hand experience in the EEAS (e.g. police 
or justice expertise) and several “generations” of 
deployed staff in missions should be promoted to 
help the interpretation of mandates.
Working group on Review Processes
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be taken further and be formalized in a new generation of 
mission mandates to perpetuate this progress. 
Faster decision-making is one important step. 
Decision-making in some first exemplary missions was 
quite swift in recent years. What is necessary is a careful 
analysis of the challenges and priorities prior to each mis-
sion, rather than micromanagement in active missions. 
Although decision-making among 28 member states may 
at times delay the process, the Foreign Affairs Council’s 
endorsement for civilian CSDP missions remains an im-
portant political signal.
An open question is which problems to tackle first in 
light of diverging strategic and political agendas. Packa-
ge deals which would, for instance, allow the exchange 
of mission modules with one another offer one way to 
address this problem. 
Flexible mission mandates should allow for more 
flexibility and modularity of missions. There is a broad 
understanding that civilian missions need longer man-
dates, given that building trust and continuity with host 
governments is crucial for their success. Additionally, as 
longer mandates offer more security for seconded per-
sonnel, they could pave the way for better staffing. What 
remains open is whether the intervals between mission 
reviews should be reduced or enlarged. Short gaps would 
ensure tailor-made, well-adapted approaches to different 
conflicts, while longer intervals would minimize the man-
power and resources spent on the reviews.
First-hand experience in the EEAS (e.g. as police or 
justice expertise) and advice by several “generations” of 
deployed staff in missions could feed into the formulation 
of mandates. There is currently no agreement on how pre-
cise or broad mission mandates and evaluations should 
be. Ideas also diverge on how to measure a successful 
mission. In particular, there is no agreement on whether 
“handing over the keys” to the local governments once the 
security situation has improved is sufficient, or whether 
more sustainable results and a proven transfer of know-
ledge is necessary to mark a success. Experts are currently 
discussing different options on the depth and methods of 
evaluation, including consultations with mission leader-
ship or independent holistic assessments. 
In terms of planning, strategic mission planning is of 
crucial importance to make civilian CSDP fit for purpose. 
Member states must discuss possible options to make the 
EEAS’s mission planning more flexible, while retaining 
ownership of CSDP. 
Executive missions in particular should be conducted 
only if a clear end is stated, and if equipped with adequa-
te resources. Experience has shown that it remains dif-
ficult to reconcile political sensitivities with the successful 
delivery of executive tasks in practice. 
Philipp Rotmann (GPPi) moderating the working group
Moving EU Civilian Crisis Management Forward: More Capable, More Flexible, More Responsive 23
DGAPreport  / January 2019
4.1. Strategic Communication –  
How to sell the Compact?
Civilian CSDP receives little attention at national level, 
which is concerning. For example, as national politici-
ans and ministries are more concerned about security 
challenges in internal rather than external security, it is 
difficult to staff civilian missions abroad with adequate 
numbers of police, judges and prosecutors. Civilian CSDP 
has even less visibility among the broader public. 
If communicated better, civilian CSDP could be presen-
ted as part of a European response to perceived and actu-
al insecurity and instability in the Union. These are only 
two of manifold reasons why strategic communication 
could benefit the overall goals of civilian CSDP. Its signifi-
cance, added value and successes need to be strategically 
communicated to relevant audiences: the line ministries, 
national politicians, host countries of missions, the 
potential secondees, and the broader public. This 
leads to the question as to how stakeholders can “sell” the 
civilian CSDP to these actors.
4. Communicating Civilian CSDP
Key Take-Aways:
 
 . There is an apparent lack in communicating the need for and the added value of civilian CSDP to different 
target audiences such as line ministries.
 . Different target audiences need to be addressed in different tailor-made ways. 
 . Better and more communication can improve the visibility of civilian CSDP. It could also help mitigate com-
mon problems such as perceived competition with internal security actors for qualified staff and resources. 
The first step is to develop more systematic approaches 
to communication. First, it is necessary to explore why it 
is difficult to reach certain target groups and effectively 
convey the messages. Findings show that there are nu-
merous potential incentives to strengthen civilian CSDP’s 
profile among the target groups. Additionally, actors 
should make targeted use of the opportunities accompa-
nying the 2018 Compact. Some suggestions to this end are 
elaborated below.
4.2. Findings: Strategic Communication of 
Civilian CSDP
Currently, stakeholders are not communicating civilian 
CSDP to the full extent to important target audiences: the 
national line ministries, national politicians, host coun-
tries of missions, the potential secondees, and the broader 
public. Through a brainstorming session the following 
results were obtained (see follwing tables). 
Andréas Hatzidiakos (French MFA) presenting the group findings Working group discussing potentials in strategic communication
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Line Ministries
Current perception Different perceptions: . Civilian CSDP is a competitor for resources . Civilian CSDP is insignificant, based on lack of understanding of its contribution to international security  
> Focus on internal issues . Practically non-existent in some countries
Incentives  . Civilian CSDP supports line ministries’ tasks > burden-sharing . Present facts and figures as tangible results of missions . Ownership and inclusion . Financial compensation . Personnel comes back with new experience and competences . Training and experience from seconded experts valuable for line ministries . Additional visibility for line ministries in public and EU institutions
Communication  . Joint Council meetings (and PSC - COSI) . Inter-ministerial meetings (institutionalized) between MFA, MoD, MoI, Ministry of Development, Chancellery . Internal-external security nexus . Organize home coming day for personnel as welcome-back and information-sharing event
Role of the 
Compact
 . Factsheet on Compact . Joint planning . Annual review . Inclusion of line ministries, e.g. through inter-ministerial meetings . Annual report to parliament
 
Potential Secondees
Current perception  . Either none, or: . Poor remuneration, burdensome for oneself as well as family, dangerous
Incentives  . Decent salary on a regular basis . Prestige and appreciation . Develop career paths if possible or applicable, e.g. police force
Communication  . Explain what civilian CSDP is, what the individuals can contribute, and which skills could be useful for missions . Use experienced personnel as spokespersons . Use videos as a medium
Role of the 
Compact
 . None, or:  . Harmonization of standards, contracts, or financial conditions
 
National Politicians
Current perception  . National politicians consider it relevant and recognize the added value, because security starts at the root causes 
Incentives  . Votes: Electorates perceive civilian engagement as better than military (differs among member states) . Explain internal-external link  . Cost-effective if compared to military expenses, and for potentially preventing a costly conflict
Communication  . Narrative One: Civilian CSDP as hard security matter. Commitments need to be leveled up with military (balance); – 
open ears. . Narrative Two: Complement rather than compete with military . For both narratives: Use experts as communicators, focus on added value, use pictures & easy language
Role of the 
Compact
 . The focus should not be on the Compact as a document, but the tasks and impacts ensuing from it; . Translate Compact into accessible language, and demonstrate links to existing aspects as well as the gaps it seeks 
to fill . Explain need for civilian CSDP . Show cooperation and seek synergies
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Broader public
Current perception  . None, or other wording: The instrument civilian CSDP is not seen, but rather its impact.
Incentives  . For countries with a stronger civilian lens in EU for crisis management: Emphasize values and peaceful nature . For countries with a stronger military tradition: Explain complementary rather than competing approach to crisis 
management
Communication  . Media interviews, especially to present local angles and local validating voices;  . Video profiles . Training classes in public schools, led by diplomats and experts  . Update websites for missions in all EU languages: Liaise with the EU Directorate-General Communication . More ministerial visits to missions . Member state governments must assume the task of communicating . Internal-external threat nexus: “L’Europe qui protège”
Role of the 
Compact
 . Use momentum to clear commitments . Make the Compact concise, readable and public . Public information as a commitment, motto: Accountability through transparency
 
Host countries
Current perception  . High turnover of EU interlocutors in the missions . Too many interlocuters, no “common voice” . Short and unclear mandates > Expectations vague
Incentives  . Concrete small projects > generate attention with tangible results (within the overall area of the mandate)
Communication  . Social networks . Dedicated campaign . Dedicated communication officers: One within the mission, one in the EEAS in Brussels
Role of the 
Compact
 . Involve local authorities in the planning phase
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